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The Lunyu, a Homeless Dog in Intellectual History 
On the dating of discourses on Confucius’ knowledge and on his success 
 





One of the main reasons to refer to the Lunyu in academic discourses is to reconstruct early 
Confucian thought. The Lunyu is obviously one of the major sources to construct early 
Chinese intellectual history. Confucius is by many intellectual historians regarded as “the first 
known ideologically active member of the shi stratum,”1 or even as “the most influential 
thinker in Chinese civilization and the first whose philosophy can be reconstructed to any 
significant degree,”2 and Confucianism accordingly as “the earliest of the competing 
tendencies in the thought of ancient China,”3 and “China’s oldest and most revered 
philosophy.”4 Using the Lunyu as a source in intellectual history means to assume that the 
Lunyu is part of an early intellectual discourse and even an important reference point for the 
beginning of Chinese philosophy. This assumption has been called into question as the dating 
of the Lunyu has become increasingly controversial. In an article that summarises some of the 
main arguments of this controversy Csikzentmihalyi and Kim conclude that in the light of 
recent archaeological finds “the Analects changes from a text about Confucius to a text that 
preserves the early textual practices of generations of writers that may include Confucius.” “It 
is hardly a reflection of Confucius’s life and times, but instead represents a complex space 
occupied by a number of people who claimed to be his spiritual or ethical followers—people 
who possessed divergent, contrasting, and continually retouched portraits of him.”5 
 
To critically reflect the practice of taking the Lunyu as a source for constructing intellectual 
history this paper will follow a hypothesis that reverses this relationship: if the Lunyu can be 
taken as a source for intellectual history then in turn intellectuall history can be taken to date 
the Lunyu. This chapter will thus ask what happens if we continue to follow the general 
                                                 
1 Pines 2012: 78. 
2 Goldin 2011: 7. 
3 Graham 1989: 31.  
4 Goldin 2011: 1. 
5 Csikzentmihalyi and Kim 2014: 163-164. 
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assumption of the Lunyu as an intellectual locus and try to locate it in intellectual history. It 
will discuss the methodological requirements and test the potential and limits of such an 
approach when applying it to the Lunyu.  
 
In order to use intellectual history to date texts we need to assume that any intellectual activity 
is confined to particular historical contexts. We then need to make a number of further 
assumptions:  
First, intellectual history comprises the following elements: concepts, ideas, thoughts, 
discourses or problems and respective terms and/or metaphors. According to our analytical 
focus we then do “history of concepts,” “history of ideas,” “history of thoughts,” “history of 
discourses,” “history of problems,” “history of terms,” or “history of metaphors.” 
Second, these elements change over time. 
Third, the changes or shifts can be dated so that a history of these elements can be 
constructed. 
Fourth, despite their historical changes something of the elements remains identical 
that allows us to speak of a historical continuity of the same element X and enables us to 
write a “history of X.” In a “history of terms,” for example, despite all historical changes in 
meaning the terms remain the same. As the identical aspects of the elements of intellectual 
history primarily relate to the contents of these elements I will refer to these aspects as topoi. 
 
These are the methodological assumptions. We also need to make sure that the text that is to 
be dated fulfills a number of basic criteria. First, it obviously needs to contain elements of 
intellectual history (see above). Second, these elements need to be identifiable on two levels: 
first, the continuous and identical part that makes it identifiable as an element X, second, the 
feature of change that makes it datable in a history of X. 
 
The Lunyu is obviously full of concepts, ideas, thoughts, discourses or problems and 
respective terms and metaphors that meet the first criterion of a text that contains elements of 
intellectual history. Yet, we hardly find any argumentation or discursive exposition of these 
elements. All we find are short authoritative statements of the Master, evaluations and 
definitions that are not even consistent throughout the book. The purpose of the book is 
obviously not to take part in, or contribute to, an intellectual debate. 
 
The following example will illustrate this. Historians of Chinese thought consider 
benevolence or humanity (ren 仁) as one of the central ideas of Confucius. To explain the 
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meaning of it, they often cite a selection of Lunyu passages in which this word is defined to 
then provide their own interpretation of the term.6 I would like to proceed similarly and 
present a few passages on ren to demonstrate in turn that the Lunyu material does not allow 





Youzi said: “There are very few who in their actions are filial towards their parents and 
respectful towards their elder sisters and yet like to offend their superiors. That someone 
who doesn’t like to offend his superiors would be fond of creating disorder has never 
happened. The gentleman regards the roots of things as fundamental. When the right 
root is established then the right way grows out of it. Filial piety and respect towards 
elders, isn’t this the root of ren? 
 
Let us reconstruct the line of thought here: filial and respectful people rarely offend their 
superiors and thus rarely cause disorder. This attitude is the basis of ren. Ren in this passage is 
therefore presented as a spirit of respect and obedience to superiors. 
 
1.3 子曰：「巧言令色，鮮矣仁！」 
The Master said: “Skillful speech and insinuating appearance rarely goes together with 
ren.”7 
 
Here, ren is opposed to artificial performance, so it means something like genuineness. It is 
unclear how this goes together with a spirit of obedience. 
 
4.2 「不仁者不可以久處約，不可以長處樂。仁者安仁，知者利仁。」 
Those who are not ren cannot endure hardship for long and cannot enjoy pleasure for 
long. Those who are ren are at home in ren, those who are wise benefit from ren.” 
 
In this passage ren is defined as something that is independent from outer circumstances such 
as hardship and pleasure. It can be positively used by wise people. This aspect of ren can be 
related (by the reader of the Lunyu) to the two aspects defined above, especially the 
genuineness. Such a relation, however, is not established by the text.  
 
4.3 子曰：「唯仁者能好人，能惡人。」 
The Master said: “Only those who are ren are able to like people and to detest people.” 
 
Ren is here related to the fair emotional judgment of others. The passage does not give any 
reason why only those who possess ren can judge others, but it seems that ren means 
                                                 
6 See as a prominent example Feng Youlan, 69-73.  
7 The same saying: “巧言令色，未可謂仁也” can be found in the Dizi wen 2005: 274 (strip 11). 
 4
something like impartiality here, detachedness, neutrality, fair-mindedness, being unbiased 
and the like. 
 
4.4 子曰：「苟志於仁矣，無惡也。」 
The Master said: “If your attention is directed to ren, then there is no wickedness.” 
 
Again, ren is related to 惡, and this might be the reason why these two passages are put 
together here. Yet, the character 惡 (pronounced “e” and not “wu” as in the preceding passage 
4.3) has a different meaning here. Ren means something like goodness (as opposed to 
wickedness) here. It does not easily connect to 4.3 as goodness is not the same as impartiality, 





The Master said: “Wealth and social status is what people desire. Yet, one shouldn’t 
settle in it if this cannot be achieved by means of the right way. Poverty and low status 
is what people despise. Yet, one should not do away with it if this cannot be achieved 
by means of the right way. If a gentleman gives up ren, wherefrom could he accomplish 
a name? A gentleman will not even for the time of finishing a meal turn against ren, 
because getting into unfavorable situations and falling into difficulties will certainly 
result from this.” 
 
In contrast to possibilities to gain wealth and social status by improper means, ren is 
introduced in this passage as a true means to establish a name. This seems to contradict other 
passages like 1.3 where ren is dissociated from attempts to please others or 4.2 where ren is 
exactly the means to be independent from outer circumstances (to which something like name 
and fame could be counted as well). The absence of ren is then in a further and entirely 
unconnected last sentence associated to getting into unfavorable situations and fall into 
difficulties. Ren thus is a sense of keeping out of trouble and turn situations into favorable 
circumstances. This reminds to the wise in 4.2 who know to use ren for their benefit, and 
name and fame might be part of this. 
 
Looking at this sample of the first relevant passages on ren in the Lunyu, it is quite obvious 
that this is an assemblage of unrelated and quite miscellaneous predications about ren. Ren is 
presented as a spirit of respect and obedience, genuineness, independence from outer 
circumstances, impartiality, goodness, or a sense of keeping out of trouble and turn situations 
into favorable circumstances. Is it possible to find a common ground for these different 
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definitions that would provide us even with some very general and basic meaning of ren that 
is not just an accumulation of all these definitions?  
 
A.C. Graham, in an effort to explain ren, defines it as “an unselfish concern for the welfare of 
others,” or covering “like English ‘noble’ the whole range of superior qualities distinctive of 
the man of breeding,”8 or “the orientation which makes right action effortless, following 
attainment of just the right balance between self and other, a precarious balance which hardly 
anyone is able to sustain,” or “the perfectly and permanently disinterested person,” or “a 
matter of attuning the desires on behalf of self and others,” or “the instant in which you 
conquer self to see self and others in perfect proportion” being “an instant in which accord 
with conventions becomes effortless and the exercise of style within fixed forms is an 
uninterrupted flow.”9 We do not only see Graham’s struggle to pin down this complex notion 
(taking recourse to such open definitions as “the whole range of superior qualities”) but even 
in his core interpretation of ren which we could summarize as ‘an unselfish, disinterested 
attitude towards the self that by attuning the own desires and being concerned with the 
welfare of others creates a proper balance between self and others and thus makes right and 
conventional actions effortless’ a number of central elements of the above small selection of 
passages is missing such as the hierarchical aspect of obedience, genuineness (as authentic 
expression of natural interests and desires) and the aspect of favorable action (which probably 
is different from right or conventional action). To include these aspects into Graham’s 
definition appears not convincing as it would probably boil down the gentleman to a butler.  
 Paul Goldin gives a similar definition as Graham: “Humanity (ren JG) […] is the 
virtue based on the method of shu. […] Shu is placing oneself in the position of others, and 
acting towards them as one imagines they would desire. […] By taking oneself as analogy.”10 
Again, a number of elements highlighted in our passages above are missing in this definition.  
 Ames and Rosemont who translate ren as “authoritative conduct” and “authoritative 
person,” even define it more open as “one’s entire person: one’s cognitive, aesthetic, moral, 
and religious sensibilities as they are expressed in one’s ritualized roles and relationships.”11 
They choose to define the term so broad that it includes almost all aspects of a person, the 
prize being that it cannot be used anymore with any analytical precision.  
                                                 
8 Graham 1989: 19. 
9 Graham 1989: 22. 
10 Goldin 2011: 19. 
11 Ames and Rosemont 1998: 49. 
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 Arthur Waley gives a similarly wide definition as “‘good’ in a extremely wide and 
general sense.”12 To illustrate this, he continues to list a selection of Lunyu-definitions of ren. 
 It is a typical and, given the nature of the Lunyu, necessary feature of intellectual 
history analyses of the Lunyu that they never use all the available features of a concept or an 
idea but have to give selective accounts of them as the many diverse definitions given in the 
Lunyu cannot be (and are not meant to be) boiled down to a less complex common ground. 
 
The definitions of ren given in the cited Lunyu passages above (and there are many more in 
the Lunyu) occur in isolated form or within small clusters of two to seven thematically related 
passages in different places of the Lunyu. The only attempt to relate them to another is the 
editorial grouping of some of them. However, as shown by the examples above, this does not 
mean that the grouped passages are in any way conceptually more related to another than they 
are to other ren-passages in the Lunyu. The explanations of ren given in this small sample 
show that we find no consistent meaning of the term ren, no common concept, idea or even 
problem that would link these different propositions. This also applies to other terms, 
concepts or ideas in the Lunyu. The book resembles a collection of tesserae some of which 
have been loosely grouped together like the ren-clusters in 1.2-1.3, 4.1-4.7, 12.1-12.3, 15.9-
15.10 or the xiao-cluster in 2.5-2.8. Intellectual historians have not only shaped these tesserae 
by their diverging interpretations but have also always used them highly selectively to 
reconstruct very different images of Confucius and his philosophy.13 I do not think that one 
has to take a post-modern perspective to claim that the Lunyu is an assemblage of mutable 
tesserae that in their entirety do not (and never intended to) amount to a full mosaic.14 Instead, 
they can only be (and have always been) used selectively to form an incomplete mosaic of 
fragments. The Lunyu can thus be compared to a mosaic construction kit or a box of Lego 
bricks containing individual textual units that according to different interpretations can even 
change color and shape and have to be (and have always been) used as convertible modular 
building blocks to construct a variety of Confucianisms.  
 The systematic incoherence of the book thus makes it difficult if not impossible to 
approach the Lunyu by means of an intellectual history analysis. The reason for this lack of 
coherence is that the primary purpose of the book is not to formulate a consistent position 
within an intellectual landscape but to portray the Master in as many facets as were available 
                                                 
12 Waley 1989: 28.  
13 See e.g. Harbsmeier 1990 and, for a different reconstruction, Wagner 1991 and 2004. 
14 This reluctance to provide a clear image of Confucius is somehow mirrored in the later iconoclast critique 
against the production of Confucius images. See Sommer 2002 and Murray 2001 and 2009. 
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from scattered sources at the time of its compilation. This, however, raises the question 
whether the Lunyu even though not aiming to construct a specific intellectual discourse does 
at least construct a particular Confucius. If the Lunyu takes part in an intellectual discourse on 
the nature, the character, the personality, the importance or the impact of Confucius then an 
intellectual history approach could probably be used to date the Lunyu by locating the Lunyu 
portrayal of Confucius in a history of portrayals of Confucius the phenomenon that Hunter 
calls “Kongzigraphy.”15  
It has been noted by many earlier authors that the Lunyu-Confucius is quite distinct 
from later depictions of the sage. Gu Jiegang suggested that we should study “one Confucius 
at a time”.16 Arthur Waley has noted that “the picture of Confucius given in the Analects […] 
differs from that of all other books in that it contains no elements that bear patently and 
obviously the stamp of folk-lore or hagiography.”17 The manufacturing of the apotheosis of 
Confucius as quasi-divine being has been object of many studies and a historical development 
of Confucius portrayals is generally assumed in literature on Confucius.18 
Yet, this process is difficult to date because there is no clear line of development from 
a Confucius bare of any hagiographic elements to the divine sage of later ages. We rather see 
the appropriation, transformation and invention of Confucius lore in Warring States and Han 
texts and constant constructions and reconstructions of Confucius tessellae. These pieces aim 
in the first place at supporting arguments of the respective texts and certainly not to contribute 
to a complete and coherent image of Confucius. To combine them, therefore, in order to gain 
an understanding of Confucius leads nowhere. Yet, these pieces gain their authority only by 
being recognizable and convincingly identifiable as part of a discourse which I will call 
“Confucian” because it gains its identity solely by being related to Confucius. This discourse 
is intertextual as it is not based on, or shaped by, one single text but constituted by a network 
of interrelated texts. The discourse is neither systematic nor unified but consists of single 
themes which are first loosely and later (by Sima Qian) more coherently linked to a 
biographical narrative. These themes can be regarded as individual and quite independent 
                                                 
15 Hunter 2012: 130. 
16 “The Confucius of the Chunqiu period was a gentleman, The Confucius of the Zhanguo period was a sage, the 
Confucius of the Western Han period was a pope, the Confucius of the Eastern Han period was again a sage, and 
now he is just about to turn into a gentleman again” 春秋时的孔子是君子，战国的孔子是圣人，西汉时的孔
子是教主，东汉后的孔子又成了圣人，到现在又快要成君子了。 Gu Jiegang 1988, vol. 2, 130. 
17 Waley 1989, 14. 
18 Cf. for example Nylan and Wilson 2010. As we know this process is still going on. In 2006, an author with the 
(quite pretentious) synonym Sanren 三人 edited a book titled Liushige Kongzi 六十个孔子 (Sixty Confuciuses) 
giving an overview over sixty different approaches to Confucius including essays by Hu Shi, Lu Xun, Lin 
Yutang, Gu Jiegang, Feng Youlan, Chen Duxiu and others. 
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subdiscourses.19 Despite all their changes throughout Chinese intellectual history these 
subdiscourses gain their identity and historical continuity by being related to specific 
problems which are held to be identical and continuous problems by the participants of the 
discourse. The identity of these problem-related discourses is marked by intertextual 
references to the same passages of early texts, by the usage of a set of interrelated terms or 
utterances which constitute a particular problem,20 by references to stories from an extensive 
archive of historical narratives which are associated to particular problems, or by references to 
protagonists that synecdochically represent such stories and the problems they stand for.  
 
 
As the Confucian discourse consists of numerous independent subdiscourses which gain their 
identity and historical continuity by being related to problems that are considered as identical 
by the members of the discourse,21 we will use the approach of a ‘history of problems’ to date 
particular Confucian subdiscourses which occur in the Lunyu.22  
A detailed analysis of the development of the main subdiscourses regarding Confucius 
is still outstanding, and such an analysis has never been used to date the Lunyu. The only 
more detailed work analyzing one of these subdiscourses has been produced by David Elstein. 
In his PhD thesis (2006) he analyzed depictions of Confucius’ authority and teacher-disciple 
                                                 
19 Early Chinese thought is often organized in thematic discourses. Discussions on particular themes (such as 
moral tendencies in human nature, Heaven’s will, or the existence or ability of ghosts and spirits) are in many 
cases exclusively lead by certain thinkers. They refer to these themes by using the same terms and formulations, 
metaphors and historical precedents. The themes are often entirely absent in texts of other contemporary 
thinkers.  
20 An early Chinese attempt to assemble the central key terms of Neo-Confucianist discourses in one book was 
Chen Chun’s 陳淳 (1159-1223) Beixi ziyi 北溪字義 (transl. by Wing-tsit Chan 1986). Zhang Dainian 張岱年 
(1909-2004) made a similar attempt with his Zhongguo gudian zhexue gainian fanchou lun 中國古典哲學概念
範疇要論 in 1989 (transl. E. Ryden 2001). 
21 I will define “discourse” here, following the approach by Busse and Teubert (1994), as a virtual text corpus 
consisting of Chinese texts written in the 3rd century BC by members of the Chinese intellectual elite that deal 
with a particular problem (which I am going to define), refer to each other and thus create an intertextual 
relationship. The unity of the discourse is delineated by my own definition of the particular problem(s) to which 
the texts relate. 
22 Whether the problems discussed in these subdiscourses were de facto relating to identical problems based in 
human reason as Windelband (Geschichte der Philosophie: Geschichte der Probleme und der zu ihrer Lösung 
erzeugten Begriffe, 1892) and Hartmann (1910, 469), the inventors of Problemgeschichte, believed or whether 
they actually change and are merely reconstructed within the historical awareness of the readers and their own 
investigative horizon as Collingwood (who thinks that in order to understand a philosophical text, a historian of 
philosophy “must see what the philosophical problem was, of which the author is here stating his solution.” See 
1946, 283) and Gadamer (1990, 375–384) see it is not relevant to our investigation. Following Gadamer’s harsh 
critique against Kant’s and Neo-Kantian scholars’ (such as Windelband and Hartmann) concept of problem 
history which he saw as a “bastard of historism” (1990, 382) later scholars like Sgarbi have in my view 
simplified the Neo-Kantian positions and downplayed the important historical dimension which can be found in 
the works of both Windelband and Hartmann. Cf. Sgarbi 2010 and his very similar English article 2011. See a 
more differentiated analysis in Oexle 2001. 
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relationship in the Lunyu.23 He did not, however, compare the ways this subdiscourse was 
dealt with in the Lunyu vis à vis other early texts in order to date the Lunyu. 
 
Looking at this history of portrayals of Confucius two other subdiscourses appear equally 
important in early portrayals of Confucius. Both can be identified as continuous topoi in early 
Chinese intellectual history and appear in such a dense frequency in early Chinese texts that 
historical shifts can be determined. Both subdiscourses are intertextual as they are not based 
on, or shaped by, one single text but constituted by a network of interrelated texts. Despite all 
their changes throughout Chinese intellectual history these subdiscourses gain their identity 
and historical continuity by being related to specific problems that are held to be identical and 
continuous problems by the participants of the subdiscourse. The identity of these problem-
related subdiscourses is marked by intertextual references to the same passages of early texts, 
by the usage of a set of interrelated terms or utterances which constitute a particular 
problem,24 by references to stories from an extensive archive of historical narratives which are 
associated to particular problems, or by references to protagonists that synecdochically 
represent such stories and the problems they stand for.  
The two subdiscourses are the nature of Confucius’ knowledge and Confucius’ failure 
to take an office to use this knowledge to implement an ideal socio-political order. Both 
themes turn into problems when linked to a) Confucius himself, especially if they are widened 
to b) relate to sages in a more general sense:  
 
1. a) Of what kind was Confucius’ knowledge? What did he know and what did 
he not know?  
b) What is sagely knowing?  
2. a) Why did Confucius never hold a high office?  
b) What is the relation between sageliness and appointment to an official post? 
 
The developments of these two discourses are historically interrelated. The greater Confucius’ 
knowledge came to be imagined the more difficult it became to explain why he was not 
properly employed and the less reliable the relationship between knowledge and success 
appeared to be. To put it the other way around, the less reliable the relationship between 
                                                 
23 Elstein 2006 and 2009. 
24 An early Chinese attempt to assemble the central key terms of Neo-Confucian discourses in one book was 
Chen Chun’s 陳淳 (1159-1223) Beixi ziyi 北溪字義 (transl. by Wing-tsit Chan 1986). Zhang Dainian 張岱年 
(1909-2004) made a similar attempt with his Zhongguo gudian zhexue gainian fanchou lun 中國古典哲學概念
範疇要論 in 1989 (transl. E. Ryden 2001). 
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knowledge and success was assumed to be, the more plausible it was to assume that 





In Chinese literature of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC, Confucius is mostly referred to as a 
learned scholar whose abundant knowledge and clear sense of morality lends authority to 
arguments that relate to him, mostly in the form of quotes.25 He is quoted as the central 
authority in the appendices to the Book of Changes as well as in many chapters of the ritual 
texts and also in the Hanfeizi and Mengzi etc., in all cases lending authority to the various 
lines of arguments.26 In many other texts we find him in the role of a teacher in dialogues. In 
the Guoyu (especially “Luyu xia” 魯語下) and Hanfeizi we find Confucius in the role of 
someone who is asked for explanations of natural calamities and anomalies which are taken to 
be based in supernatural institutions like spirits, ancestors, or Heaven. Confucius answers 
these kinds of questions in all cases in a way, which never leaves a question open but in each 
case gives a full explanation without reference to the supernatural.27 Confucius does not play 
an important role in the huge corpus of excavated texts from the pre-Han era.28 In many of the 
tomb text corpora he does not appear at all. Even in the “philosophical library” of Guodian he 
is absent.29 The only pre-Han corpus in which he features more prominently is the Shanghai 
Museum collection where he appears in eleven or twelve texts, mainly in the role of a teacher 
teaching his disciples and rulers about poetry, ritual and government.30 In the Zuo zhuan we 
find Confucius, like in most other early texts, without exception in the role of the sage who 
knows the historical context and provides morally correct judgements. In the Xunzi, 
Confucius is presented as one of the great Ru who knows everything about right and wrong 
and has the elaborate Ru knowledge that enables him to govern like the ancient sage kings. 
                                                 
25 See for a more detailled discussion of my argument in the first part of the paper Gentz 2012. 
26 Whether and how these references to Confucius are similar or related to the way as the Shijing and Shangshu 
are referred to in other texts as sources of authority needs to be discussed elsewhere. 
27 Guoyu (“Luyu xia” 魯語下) 1988: 201, 213, 214; Chen 1974, 686. 
28 This changes slightly with the Han manuscripts. In the Mawangdui texts he appears in the commentarial texts 
on the Yijing, we find him in one text (Rujia zhe yan 儒家者言) of the Fuyang Shanggudui manuscripts, and two 
texts (Lunyu fragments and Rujia zhe yan 儒家者言) of the Dingzhou manuscripts include his sayings.  
29 Unless we assume that the “zi” 子 in the formulation “zi yue” 子曰 in the Zi yi 緇衣 refers to him. 
30 See the texts, “Kongzi shilun 孔子詩論,” “Min zhi fumu 民之父母,” “Zi Gao 子羔,” “Lu bang da han 魯邦大
旱,” “Zhong gong 仲弓,” “Xiang bang zhi dao 相邦之道,” “Ji Kangzi wen yu Kongzi 季康子問于孔子,” “Junzi 
wei li 君子為禮” (where Confucius is even considered worthier than Shun and Yu), “Dizi wen 弟子問” (which 
is similar to the Lunyu in many respects), “Kongzi jian Ji Huanzi 孔子見季桓子,” “Yan Yuan wen yu Kongzi 顏
淵問於孔子” etc., probably “Zi yi 緇衣.” 
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The question whether Confucius is omniscient (無所不知) is also discussed and confirmed by 
his disciples.31 The Xunzi is the first text that addresses the question which kind of knowledge 
great Ru possess and clearly defines it in contrast to the expert knowledge of other specialists 
in which they are superior to everyone else. It makes it clear however, that the kind of 
knowledge which great Ru possess is the most important of all.32 
 
The Lunyu depicts Confucius differently. Confucius appears not only as a great teacher who 
knows right and wrong in all circumstances, knows the correct meaning of terms and all the 
historical narratives, but as a more complex personality. He is portrayed as a multi-layered 
and ambiguous figure who is uncertain about many issues, poses questions rather than 
providing answers and in many instances even questions, in a rather fundamental way, the 
possibility of knowledge by clearly pointing out its limits. The Lunyu often chooses a 
negative mode in describing what Confucius refrained from doing, did not like, criticized, 
was not able to accomplish and did not teach.33 The readers learn that “The Master was 
resolute in four things: don’t speculate, don’t take anything as necessary, don’t insist rigidly 
on certainties, don’t put yourself at the center of things.”34 They further learn that “The 
Master didn’t talk of prodigies, use of force, disorder or spirits,”35 that the Master did not talk 
about “natural disposition (xing 性) or the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道),”36 or that the 
Master transmitted but did not create.37 We thus gain the image of a master who pays great 
attention drawing a very clear line between what he knows and what he does not know.38 In 
2.17 he teaches Zilu what wisdom/knowledge (zhi 知) is, namely to know what one knows 
and to know what one does not know.39 In 9.8 the Master claims that he has no knowledge 
and only infers from the given evidence. The Lunyu has plenty of statements that give further 
expression to this attitude, which reflects Confucius’ doubts (huo 惑), unease, incertainty and 
not-knowing. Confucius often appears fragile, full of sorrow, worries (you 憂) or despair 
                                                 
31 Wang 1988, 531. 
32 Wang 1988, 122–124.  
33 Lunyu 2.18, 7.27, 3.21, 5.13, 7.1, 7.21, 7.23, 7.24, 9.1, 9.7, 11.12, 13.3, 14.6. 
34 Lunyu 9.4. 子絕四: 毋意，毋必，毋固，毋我. 
35 Lunyu 7.21. 子不語怪，力，亂，神. For the use of force see Lunyu 15.1. 
36 Lunyu 5.13. 
37 Lunyu 7.1. 子曰: 述而不作. 
38 Further Lunyu evidence in 2.17, 2.18, 9.8, 11.12, 13.3, 14.1 etc. This skepticism of Confucius in regard to his 
own knowledge was cited already in 1854 by Henry David Thoreau who greatly admired this attitude. Cf. 
Thoreau 1996, 14. 
39 This passage is a good example for zhi meaning “to know” and not merely “to understand” or “to recognize,” 
the meanings of which would not really make sense in an interpretation of this passage. 
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because he has never met (wei jian 未見…) excellent people or is miserable himself,40 and he 
is presented in states of uncertainty in which he claims that he doesn’t know an answer (bu zhi 
ye 不知也, wei zhi 未知) and has no solution for certain fundamental questions.41 Moreover, 
there are many categorial statements about what Confucius did not talk about and what he did 
not teach.42 We do not find such a portrayal of Confucius’ limits of knowledge in other early 




The Master said: ‘It is three elements of the Way of a gentleman that I am not able to 
realize: the benevolent do not worry, the wise do not doubt, the brave do not fear.’ 
Zigong said: ‘This is your own Way.’ 
 
The only text I am aware of where, in regard to knowledge, Confucius displays a similar 
attitude as the Lunyu-Confucius is the Gongyang zhuan (which claims to pass down 
Confucius’ reading of the Chunqiu and thus Confucius’ exegetical attitude).44 In a number of 
passages the commentary admits openly that it does not know how to interpret a certain entry, 
sentence or word. The Gongyang zhuan in these cases sometimes writes “wu wen yan er” 無
聞焉爾 (nothing has been heard of this/him).45  
If we follow Confucius’ statement in Lunyu 15.26 that he can still remember the days 
when a scribe left gaps in the patterns of the records, this historiographical practice of the 
                                                 
40 Lunyu 5.10, 5.11, 5.27, 7.3, 7.5, 7.26, 9.9, 11.2, 13.21, 15.13. The rhetoric of never yet having seen some 
kinds of excellent people can already been seen in the Dizi wen 2005: 269, 280 (strips 4, 21, 22) and 271, 273 
(strips 6, 9). 
41 Lunyu 2.17, 3.11, 5.8, 5.19, 13.3, 15.1. 
42 Lunyu 2.18, 7.27, 3.21, 5.13, 7.1, 7.21, 7.23, 7.24, 9.1, 9.7, 11.12, 13.3, 14.6. 
43 There is a passage in the Xunzi in which it reflects in a way rather reminiscent of Lunyu 2.17 about knowledge 
(also in a dialogue with Zilu): “Therefore the gentleman when he knows something he says he knows it when he 
doesn’t know it he says that he doesn’t know it, and this is the essence of talking.” 故君子知之曰知之，不知曰
不知，言之要也！ Now this passage follows immediately after the passage quoted above in which the 
omniscience of Confucius is confirmed by his disciples. Chapter 29 in which these passages occur is part of the 
last block of Xunzi chapters which by some scholars have been dated to Han times, so they might have been 
influenced by Lunyu material. As chapter 29 does not reflect core philosophical thoughts associated with Xunzi 
and is to great parts composed of dialogues between Zilu and Confucius they might also reflect earlier Lunyu 
material. 
44 That this is an assumption of the Gongyang text itself is mainly based on the commentary in Zhao 12.1 where 
zi yue 子曰 clearly refers to Confucius as he refers to himself as Qiu 丘 at the end of the quote. In this quote he 
explicitely states that he is responsible for the wording of the Chunqiu 其詞則丘有罪焉耳！See a translation of 
the full passage below. 
45 GYZ Yin 2.7, Huan 14.3, Wen 14.11 (I refer to the Gongyang zhuan by giving numbers for each entry 
according to the arrangement of the text in the Harvard Yenching Index by Hong Ye 1983). Even in a case in 
which it is quite obvious from the recording pattern of the Chunqiu that a character (auch as the month 月 in 
Huan 14.3) is missing the Gongyang zhuan takes the transmitted form of the Chunqiu as authoritative and rather 
doubts its own understanding than the reliability of the record. 
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Gongang zhuan seems to reflect exactly this attitude, an attitude of being clearly aware of the 
limits of one’s own knowledge.  
In other cases the Gongyang zhuan gives two possible options without making a 
decision, clearly marking the gaps of historical knowledge. In these cases it writes “wei zhi qi 
wei a yu? wei b yu?” 未知其為 a 與? 為 b 與? (we don’t know whether a or b is the case).46 
In other cases, the Gongyang zhuan shows where Confucius was in doubt like in the 
following example: 
 
曷為以二日卒之. 怴也. 甲戌之日亡. 己丑之日死而得. 君子疑焉. 故以二日卒之也. 
Why are two dates given in recording his death? He became crazy. On the day jiaxu 
(12th month, 21st day) he disappeared and on the day jichou (1st month, 6th day) he was 
found dead. The gentleman was in doubt about [the exact date of his death] and 
therefore used two dates to record his death.47 
 
In some cases the commentary also presents several alternative views: “huo yue a (huo yue 
b)” 或曰 a (或曰 b) (someone else says a [someone else says b]).48 We find this either when 
alternative historical narratives are presented49 or when alternative ritual rules or explanations 
are given. Sometimes the Gongyang zhuan expresses a preference for one of the given 
options.50 In most cases, however, the Gongyang zhuan wants to point out that in these 
particular instances the message of the Chunqiu does not lie in its historical accuracy but in 
hinting at something else (which is then explained by the commentary). 
The records concerning calamities or anomalies (zai yi 災異) are indicative of another 
feature of the Gongyang zhuan which it shares with the Lunyu Confucius who “didn’t talk of 
prodigies, the use of force, disorder or spirits.”51 Only two out of 140 such records reflect the 
cause of these natural calamities and anomalies.52 Most of the entries about natural calamities 
or anomalies are not commented upon at all. The Gongyang zhuan at the most only explains 
                                                 
46 Huan 9.4, Wen 11.6, Xiang 2.7, Zhao 31.6, Ai 14.1. 
47 Huan 5.1. 
48 Zhuang 25.3, Min 2.6, Xi 33.3, Cheng 1.6, Xiang 19.2. In Yamada 1957, Yamada Taku has interpreted these 
passages as a proof of the multilayered character of the Gongyang zhuan. He has added to these another 32 
Gongyang-passages in which statements of the Gongyang zhuan expresses doubt by adding the term gai 蓋 
(“probably”); cf. 166–169. 
49 Cheng 1.6. Who defeated them? Jin probably defeated them. Someone else says: the MaoRong defeated them. 
孰敗之. 蓋晉敗之. 或曰. 貿戎敗之． 
50 Ai 14.1. 
51 Lunyu 7.21. 子不語怪，力，亂，神. 
52 Xi 15.11 and Xuan 15.9 (probably also Ai 14.1). In Wen 9.12, an earthquake is just defined as “a movement of 
the earth” (動地也) although it is qualified as a record of an anomaly (記異也), and in Ai 4.8 the burning of an 
altar is classified as a conflagration (災, as opposed to Xi 15.11, where a lightning that strikes an ancestral 
temple is classified as an anomaly [記異也] and explained as a “warning from Heaven” 天戒), the reason for its 
recording is explained accordingly just as a record of a conflagration (記災也).   
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that this is an entry concerning a natural calamity or anomaly. Given the fact that the 
Gongyang commentary normally gives reasons for strange phenomena and explains causes of 
recorded events one can take this silence as a practice of not talking about supernatural 
phenomena. This resembles the Confucius of the Lunyu who, according to the Gongyang 
zhuan, in his compilation of the Chunqiu deleted records from the original annalistic sources 
that appeared overly fantastic to him.53 
 Other methods of his Chunqiu compilation indicated in the Gongyang zhuan also 
conform to typical features of the Lunyu Confucius. Accordingly, in compiling the Chunqiu 
Confucius used most of the historical material without major changes (see quote below). 
Thus, by and large the Chunqiu does not differ fundamentally from the original Chunqiu of 
Lu. Confucius in the Gongyang zhuan, just like in the Lunyu, is portrayed as a transmitter, not 
a creator,54 and as an editor who inserts his own judgements in such a subtle way that it does 
not affect the value of the Chunqiu as a historial record by trustworthy scribes (xin shi 信史). 
 
To summarize, firstly, within the Gongyang zhuan we find the open admission of not 
knowing certain things rather than the ironclad answering of all questions. Secondly, we find 
an attitude that may be described as caution in respect to speaking about or even to explaining 
supernatural phenomena. Finally, we find an extremely great respect for the original annalistic 
text, which in major parts provides the source material of the new compilation with minor 
changes only. These changes scarcely interfere with the historical content of the text in order 
to transmit it as a reliable historical source. In the exegesis of the Gongyang zhuan we thus 
find exactly the same attitudes that we found as unique attributions of Confucius in the Lunyu. 
Unlike the Lunyu, however, the Gongyang zhuan does not talk about these attitudes and does 
not attribute them explicitly to Confucius. We only find them implicit in the exegetical 




The unique and quite obvious parallels of a doubtful attitude towards knowledge and 
understanding that we find throughout the Lunyu and the Gongyang zhuan are striking. But 
the following problems arise when we try to infer a date of the Lunyu from these unique 
parallels?  
                                                 
53 Cf. the case of falling stars that plummeted all the way down to one foot from the earth and then returned in 
Zhuang 7.3. 
54 Lunyu 7.1. 子曰: 述而不作，信而好古. 
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First, the Lunyu does not provide an epistemological discourse on knowledge, it not even 
gives reasons for the Master’s behavior. The Master’s attitude towards knowledge has to be 
inferred from short statements that do not reason or argue. These statements are exemplary 
and casuistic and often describe practices rather than analyzing concepts or ideas. The Lunyu 
therefore does not contribute to an ongoing discourse on knowledge and also does not 
formulate a distinct historical position that could be dated. 
 Second, there is even less of an explicit intellectual discourse on knowledge in the 
Gongyang zhuan. The main evidence we have to infer a particular attitude towards knowledge 
is the exegetical practice of the commentary. The relation between exegetical practice and 
intellectual discourse, however, is hard to determine and even harder to date.  
 Moreover, the dating of the Gongyang zhuan is not clear enough to base the dating of 
another text on it. My own dating of the Gongyang zhuan is tentative and not conclusive.55 It 
suggests dates of particular stages within a process of text formation within which I would not 
be able to locate the exegetical attitude that resembles the one in the Lunyu. 
Furthermore, there are no mutual references in the Lunyu and the Gongyang zhuan. 
They also do not use a common terminology. We therefore have no indication that both 
attitudes were related to a common discourse. Different kinds of skeptical attitudes can be 
found everywhere in the early texts over a time span of several hundred years, the skeptical 
attitude towards knowledge is just one of these and does not necessarily originate either in the 
Lunyu or the Gongyang zhuan. 
Even if we assume that they related to a common discourse, the parallels do not 
necessarily indicate a common date. The Gongyang zhuan was quite prominent in the Early 
Han and, even if it would date early, could have influenced Lunyu compilers then as well.  
 Although some features of the Lunyu Confucius are unique and only shared with some 
aspects of the Gongyang commentary, there is no historical development from a Confucius 
who is skeptical towards knowledge to one who is omniscient. As the omniscient Confucius 
already appears in such early texts as the Zuo zhuan, the Guoyu or the Mengzi, the only 
possibility to date such a non-omniscient Confucius would in such a timeline be an earlier 
date. It appears much more likely then that the Lunyu reflects a tradition that has to be defined 
in social or local terms rather than in terms of time. 
 
                                                 
55 See Gentz 2001, 345–403, with conclusion on 401–402. See also Gentz (forthcoming). 
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The quite distinct portrayal of a doubting Confucius in the Lunyu is not part of a systematic 
discourse on knowledge. Doubt, sorrow and uncertainty are rather reported as features of 
Confucius’s personality than discussed as a methodological or epistemological issues. They 





A typical successful life for anyone whom we would imagine as a proper Confucian of the 
late imperial era in China would include an in-depth education in the Confucian classics, a 
brilliant performance in the state examinations and, finally, a high post as a government 
official.56  
 One of the central messages of these and earlier historiographical and hagiographical 
accounts, starting probably with narratives such as those transmitted in the Shangshu and the 
Zuo zhuan, is the empirical proof of the early Zhou ideology that there is a relationship 
between moral conduct and success in life. That virtuous behavior is the most powerful means 
to transform political and social contexts is an assumption that can be found in all texts 
connected to the Confucian tradition.  
 Yet, the three most eminent founders of that tradition, Kong Qiu 孔丘, Meng Ke 孟軻 
(371-289) and Xun Kuang 荀況 (c. 310- c. 210), did not match this ideal pattern of a 
successful life in their own individual biographies. Although certainly following their moral 
principles and knowing and teaching how to rule a state none of them held a long-term high 
government post or was able to bring about a change in their own deplorable times. The book 
Xunzi even concludes with an eulogy explaining why Master Xun, although he held no 
official post, had no followers and was not widely known yet still has to be considered a 
worthy with the mind of a sage (sheng zhi xin 聖之心) who just did not meet the right times 
(bu yu shi 不遇時). This fundamental contradiction between sagehood and successful life has 
fostered a number of discussions about the life of Confucius, considered by some to be the 
last of the great sages in the world. 
The main works that I have found to reflect this discussion in the pre-Qin era are the 
Qiongda yi shi 窮達以時 manuscript from Guodian 郭店 the Guishen zhi ming 鬼神之明 
                                                 
56 See the many exemplary biographies of eminent and model Confucian scholar-officials in the dynastic 
histories, in diverse novels and in collections that bear titles such as: Xianru gongde lu 賢儒功德錄, Mingchen 
kaoyi 名臣考義, Mingru zhuan 名儒傳, Xueshu bian 學術編, x-ru xuean x-儒學案, zongzhuan 宗傳, Renwu 
kao 人物考, Xueshu lu 學術錄 etc. Cf. Wilson1995; Ching and Fang 1987; Chen 1994.  
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from the Shanghai Museum corpus, the Mengzi 孟子, the Xunzi 荀子, and the Lüshi Chunqiu 
呂氏春秋. The analysis of the development of this discussion will finally result in a further 
argument on the dating of the Lunyu. 
 
 
I. Qiongda yi shi 57 
The text starts with a general statement: 
There is Heaven and there is man. Heaven and man are distinct. When investigating 
Heaven and man’s distinction, one understands what makes things going. When there is 
the right man, but there are not the right times, then even though he be worthy, he will 
not be able to put his worthiness into action. However, if there were the right times, what 
difficulties will there be? 
 
This introductory passage is followed by a range of historical examples that illustrate this 
statement and is concluded as follows: 
 
That in the beginnings [these virtuous men] lived in obscurity, and later had their names 
extolled, is not because their virtue had increased.  
 
A second passage with further examples ends with the following explanation: 
 
 [In all the above cases] whether or not they encountered favorable circumstance – lay 
with Heaven. 
Their actions were not executed for the sake of success; therefore when failing they were 
not distressed.  
Their efforts were not made for the sake of achieving a reputation; therefore when 
nobody knew them, they did not feel disgraceful.  
 
This is followed by a third passage of examples that ends with the following passage: 
 
Failure and success happen according to time;  
[…] 
It is for this reason that the gentleman prizes self-examination. 
 
This early short text summarizes the theme of our discussion in an extremely dense and 
stylistically sophisticated form. It shows that the main arguments and terms of a discussion on 
the disturbing problem that empirical evidence cannot prove a relationship between leading a 
good life and enjoying a good fate were already set up around 300 BC. They were embedded 
in a discourse on timeliness that referred to a number of well-known historical precedents. 
The text further shows that this specific discourse at that early stage was not necessarily 
                                                 
57 Several English translations of this text have been made: Meyer 2012, 57–67; Cook 2012, 453–464; Gentz 
(unpublished manuscript 2014).  
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related to Confucius, whose case would not be missing from any later discussion on the theme 
but is not mentioned here.  
 The central conceptual terms in this discourse are shi 世 and shi 時 as the basic 
notions of time, the first referring primarily to the time of a particular social setting, the 
second in a more abstract sense to a period or a concrete point of time. These terms are also 
used as the main notions of time in all later discussions on timeliness.  
“Encountering [favorable circumstance]” (yu 遇) is yet another central concept that is 
related to Heaven and to time and refers to encounters that are taken as condition for the 
realization of a hidden potential, a realization that leads to a successful, good life. The term 
for this kind of realization is da 達.  
Opposed to Heaven are humans ren 人 with whom the notions of virtues de 德 and 
merits gong 功 are associated. These depend on men themselves. They are, however, only 
potentials that do not have the power to bring about a successful good life by themselves. 
They are regarded as failures (qiong 窮) if for whatever reason they cannot be implemented 
by means of an official position. If they can be implemented they are sucessful (da 達). The 
terms qiong 窮 and da 達 are also used in other texts on timeliness. The Lunyu, the Xunzi, the 
Zhuangzi and the Lüshi Chunqiu employ these terms in the same discursive contexts. 
 The two historical precedents that the discussions frequently refer to are the sage 
emperor Shun 舜 and Wu Zixu 伍子胥. The third and central case for all later discussions on 
success and failure, which is not listed in the Qiongda yi shi is Confucius, especially the 
situation when he was stranded with his disciples between Chen and Cai.58 
 The main point established by the Qiongda yi shi is the strict separation between 
Heaven and man. It clearly defines and explains the limits of man’s effort in regard to a 
successful good life. Neither virtue nor merit are sufficient to generate success in life. The 
efficacy of any human action only depends on the right moment in time, which lies entirely 
with Heaven, not with man. In the Qiongda yi shi the Heavenly sphere is so strictly separated 
from man that not even divination by oracles, milfoil stalks or seasonal rituals can indicate 
appropriate timing for human action. How can humans then lead a good life? The last 
paragraph of the Qiongda yi shi formulates the consequences which this insight (proven 
empirically in the text with historical examples) leaves for human aspirations to be drawn. As 
humans have no influence on the efficacy of their actions, the only thing they can do is 
                                                 
58 This story has been analyzed in detail by Makeham 1998. A similar analysis of Confucius stories that appear 
across early Chinese texts has been presented by Weingarten 2010. 
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generate the potential for virtuous action, de xing 德行, and entirely concentrate on their own 
perfection, fan ji 反己, without any consideration as to its effects. The Qiongda yi shi does 
not discuss in how far the virtues cultivated by men provide a condition of success, a claim 
put forward in later discussions. 
 
II Guishen zhi ming59 
 
The Guishen zhi ming takes the same basic problem as starting point of its discussion on the 
capability of ghosts and spirits to interfere in the human world to ensure that rewards and 
punishments are applied according to the virtue of the human protagonists. Presenting some 
of the historical examples connected to this discourse (Shun, Wu Zixu etc.) it concludes in a 
similar fashion as the Qiongda yi shi: 
  
If one examines this, then some among the good people were not rewarded and some 
among the brutes were not punished.  
 
The text then provides its own explanation: 
 
Therefore, when I accordingly propose that ‘ghosts and spirits are not clear,’ then this 
must have a [further] reason. Is it that their power suffices to reach out to them and yet 
they won’t do it? I do not know. Or is it that their power in fact does not suffice to reach 
out to them? I also do not know. As these two are different, I [just] say: there are things 
ghosts and spirits are clear about and things they are not clear about.60  
 
The Guishen zhi ming refers to a different conceptual framework to respond to the problem. 
That Shun became Son of Heaven was not because he encountered Yao but because ghosts 
and spirits in his case were clear about his good actions. That the worthy Wu Zixu died was 
due to the ghosts and spirits not being clear about his worthiness in this case.  
The same general empirical problem of a disconnect between virtue and reward is 
taken up by both texts to provide two different models of explanation: fateful encounters and 
the powers of penetration of ghosts and spirits. In contrast to the Qiongda yi shi’s encounter 
approach, the demonological approach which the Guishen zhi ming takes in the discourse of 
                                                 
59 Several English translations of this text have been made: Ding 2006; Brindley 2009; Sterckx 2013, 122–125; 
Marco Caboara (unpubl. manuscript 2013), Gentz (unpublished manuscript 2014).  





this problem is unique in early Chinese literature and is nowhere taken up, nor even referred 
to. 
 
III Mengzi  
 
The Mengzi discusses the same problem of how virtue is related to a successful life by 
approaching the whole issue from different assumptions. Focusing on Confucius as the new 
model of a sage, a successful life is defined in moral terms as a life in which inner virtues 
have been cultivated. Fame, wealth, and official positions are viewed as external success of 
secondary importance. Confucian virtues such as benevolence and righteousness are opposed 
to material profit, prosperity and animalish appetites, even in existential situations: a beggar 
rather starves to death than taking food that is given abusively as long as he has not lost his 
true heart,61 which is now considered the most basic criterium for a successful life.  
When the Mengzi discusses taking office it refers several times critically to Bo Yi,62 
the sage who refused to take office in times when a bad government was in place, for being 
too much concerned with being unsullied and not taking responsibility. It is equally critical 
against Yi Yin who in reverse would take any office in any circumstances without caring 
about the government. Confucius, however, who would take office according to 
circumstances,63 is highly praised in the Mengzi as the sage who “gathered together all that 
was accomplished”64 and surpassed all other sages.65 He is therefore praised in the Mengzi as 
the “sage of timeliness” (孔子，聖之時者也 5B1). Timeliness (shi 時) here is obviously not 
related to a Heavenly moment that would have allowed Confucius to put his sagely potential 
into effect on an official post and bring peace and order to the world (as in the examples of 
the Qiongda yi shi), but to a perfect weighing up66 of when to take office in times of disorder. 
Confucius, as we read in 3B3, like other gentlemen, was eager to take office; he even became 
agitated when he was not in service for three months and is criticized to show unseemly haste. 
Asked why then, being so eager to seek office, he found it so hard to take one, the Mengzi 
responds that he would never seek it by dishonorable means. According to Mengzi 5B4 
Confucius’ motives when seeking office were threefold: “Confucius took office sometimes 
                                                 
61 Cf. Mengzi 6A10. 
62 Cf. Mengzi 2A2, 3B10, 5B1 much in the same manner as Lunyu 18.8. 
63 可以仕則仕，可以止則止，可以久則久，可以速則速 2A2 or: 可以速而速，可以久而久，可以處而處
，可以仕而仕 5B1. 
64 集大成 5B1. 
65 自生民以來，未有盛于孔子也 2A2. 
66 The concept of weighing up according to the circumstances (quan 權) is a central concept of Mencian 
philosophy. See also Vankeerberghen 2005–06. 
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because he could realize his Way, sometimes because he was treated with decency, and 
sometimes because a prince supported good people at court.”67 The whole book 5B deals with 
the question of what kind of relationship gentlemen and rulers should have, what kind of 
positions gentlemen should take, what salaries, and what kind of gifts, if any, they should 
accept. 5B5 gives poverty as another motive for Confucius to take (low) office. Poverty, 
however, plays no central role in the discussion about taking office. As Makeham notes: “the 
root problem was not poverty but powerlessness, a lack of position,”68 and a constant “job 
hunting”69 as reflected in several passages in the Mengzi including the above discussed 3B3 
and 5B4. 
Heaven is never mentioned in the discussion about office-seeking. Yet the Mengzi 
emphasizes Heaven as the crucial player in the determination of fate.70 It is also Heaven, not 
man, that confers the right to rule over the empire upon someone.71 But in contrast to the 
Qiongda yi shi these passages stand alone72 and are nowhere developed into any conceptual 
discourse. In other passages, however, we do find an innovative concept that defines another 
external condition for the possibility of the appearance of a sage. In three passages the Mengzi 
introduces the concept of a general law of alterning order and disorder in the world.73 It gives 
a very lively and dramatic narrative of these two alternating phases in 3B9 claiming in other 
passages that every 500 years a sage appears in the world.74 Although these patterns appear 
like a Heavenly law, this idea is not developed in an argumentative discourse. Heaven is 
mentioned several times as the crucial determining force of history, fate and the positions of 
rulers. Yet the argumentative focus in the Mengzi when it comes to discussing Confucius’ life 
lies rather on the lack of support of men in power. Confucius’ failure is mainly explained as 
                                                 
67孔子有見行可之仕，有際可之仕，有公養之仕也。 
68 Makeham 1998, 78. The Mozi’s account of the story of Confucius between Chen and Cai also takes up the 
theme of poverty to illustrate Confucius’ hypocrisy, see Makeham 1998, 81. 
69 Makeham 1998, 89. 
70 See the final passage of 1B16: “[Mengzi] said: ‘When one moves, something causes it, when one halts, one is 
hindered by something. Moving and halting is nothing that lies in man’s ability. That I did not encounter the 
Marquis of Lu is due to Heaven.’” 曰：行或使之，止或尼之，行止非人所能也。吾之不遇魯侯，天也。
The passage strikingly recalls Qiongda yi shi. Heaven, not man, is responsible for whether or not men encounter 
favorable circumstance (yu 遇). And destiny decides man’s fate (see the first few passages of book 7A, also 
2B13). 
71 Cf. Mengzi 5A5: “Wan Zhang said, ‘That Yao gave the world to Shun, did that really happen?’ Mengzi said: 
‘No. The Son of Heaven cannot give the world to somebody else.’ ‘In that case, who then gave the world to 
Shun?’ [Mengzi] said: ‘Heaven gave it to him.’” 萬章曰：“堯以天下與舜，有諸？” 孟子曰：“否。天子不能
以天下與人。” “然則舜有天下也，孰與之？” 曰：“天與之。” 
72 For a more detailed analysis of “The Mencian view of ming (‘fate’; destiny)” see Eno 2005, esp. 8–9. 
73 Cf. Mengzi 3B9: 天下之生久矣，一治一亂, see also 2B13, 7B38. 
74 Cf. Mengzi 2B13 and 7B38. Hans van Ess argues that 7B38 must be later, probably 2nd century BC. See van 
Ess 2009.  
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being caused by lack of human support, not by a lacking support by Heaven.75 These 
statements somehow contradict other statements in the Mengzi which claim that benevolence 
(ren) is matchless.76 Benevolence and other virtues appear like a magic weapon in these 
passages, particularly in times of disorder, yet, this power seems to be effective only if 
exerted by a ruler and seems conceptionally to be entirely disconnected from a sage like 
Confucius.  
All in all it is quite striking how strictly the Mengzi separates power and responsibility 
on the one side from Confucius on the other so that his failure appears entirely as the failure 
of the authorities in power. The main question in the Mengzi therefore is: where and how do 
we seek office at ruler’s courts? The case of Confucius, the greatest sage of all, is nowhere 
connected to Heaven, timeliness or other external non-human forces.  
 
Qiongda yi shi, Guishen zhi ming and Mengzi provide three different approaches to the basic 
problem that morality and fate often do not correspond. The Qiongda yi shi explains this by a 
strict separation of Heaven and man. A successful life needs both, excellence and timeliness. 
The Guishen zhi ming in contrast refers to a demonological explanation scheme. Successful 
life is granted by ghosts and spirits, and it is due to their inability or unwillingness that a 
correspondence between morality and fate is often not realized. Both texts refer to the 
historical precedents of Shun and Wu Zixu as representative of lucky (Shun) and unlucky 
(Wu Zixu) fates. The Mengzi does not address this problem in the same explicit discursive 
manner as these two texts. It discusses the same problem in regard to the positions of kings 
and of Confucius and proposes different explanative models for them. A ruler’s position is 
partly determined by Heaven whereas the position of Confucius is entirely dependent first on 
                                                 
75 See for example 5A6, which begins with the continuation of the argument in 5A5 that Heaven decides who 
rules the world. The reason why Confucius never became a ruler, however, is not, as in the other cases, attributed 
to Heaven’s decision but to the Son of Heaven not recommending him: “In order to rule the world, a common 
man must not only have the virtue of a Shun or a Yu [which Confucius had of course] but also the support of an 
emperor. Therefore, Confucius never ruled the world.” 匹夫而有天下者，德必若舜、禹，而又有天子荐之者。
故仲尼不有天下。 Based on the translation by Lau, Mencius, p. 145. In 7B18 the Mengzi refers to the famous 
story of Confucius being stranded with his disciples in the region of Chen and Cai, one of the frequently cited 
illustrations of Confucius failed life. Mengzi explains this situation again with the lack of support by the 
authorities in power: “Mengzi said, ‘That the gentleman [Confucius] was in danger between Chen and Cai was 
because he had no connections to superiors at court.’” 孟子曰：君子之厄於陳蔡之閒，無上下之交也。 
76 See for example Mengzi 4A7 quoting Confucius: “Confucius said, ‘Benevolence cannot be quantified. As a 
matter of fact, if the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he will be matchless in the world.’” 孔子曰：仁不可為
眾也。夫國君好仁，天下無敵。Transl. Lau, 1970, 121. Or, using another Confucius quote in 2A1: 
“Confucius said, [Governmental] virtue spreads faster than an order transmitted through posting stations. At the 
present time, if a state of ten thousand chariots were to practise benevolent government, the people would rejoice 
as if they had been released from hanging by the heels. Just now is the time therefore when one will surely, with 
half effort, achieve twice as much as the ancients.” 孔子曰：德之流行，速於置郵而傳命。 當今之時，萬乘
之國行仁政，民之悅之，猶解倒懸也。故事半古之人，功必倍之，惟此時為然。 
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his own willingness to take office (this is an important issue in the Mengzi) and then mainly 
on the willingness of the rulers to employ him. Neither Heaven or timeliness nor ghosts or 
spirits are responsible for Confucius failure to take office. 
 
 
IV Xunzi 荀子 
 
The Xunzi is the first text that combines the two discourses of the Qiongda yi shi and the 
Mengzi. In “Of Honor and Disgrace” (榮辱), the Xunzi seems to propagate a straightforward 
correlation between virtue and success. Honorable men will enjoy benefits, disgraceful men 
will suffer harm. However, its usage of the term chang 常 (normally), leaves space for 
exceptions such as Confucius. In “Contra Twelve Philosophers” there is a clear sense that 
Confucius and other sages failed in their life, as attested by the claim “that even this kind of 
sages do not always gain a position of power is proven by the examples of Confucius and 
Zigong.”77 Counterexamples of sages who have attained power are, again, Shun and Yu. 
Although according to the Xunzi a great Ru will influence the whole world with his greatness, 
he is only able to do so if he is in office. If he fails to get an office (qiong 窮) he will be 
ridiculed by ordinary Ru, but he will obtain a great reputation because he never parts from the 
true Way although he lives as a poor man in reclusion.78 The Xunzi shares the Mengzi’s 
assumption of a division between a virtuous life and great wealth, fame and official posts. It 
does, however, believe that virtuous conduct leads to respect and fame. The Xunzi’s 
explanation of Confucius’ failure reveals striking parallels to the Qiongda yi shi when it ends 
its chapter “On Confucius”: “Hence the gentleman bends in times that require bending and 
straightens out in times that require straightening.”79 In this and in other chapters we find a 
reflection of the Mencian idea of acting according to timely circumstances and of Confucius 
being the sage of timeliness. Yet timeliness, although a high Ruist ideal, does not explain 
success.  
 “Working Songs” (成相) contains a number of laments which, much in the same 
manner as the Mengzi, place the responsibility for success or failure of great Ru on the times 
                                                 
77 是聖人之不得埶者也，仲尼子弓是也。 Wang 1988, 97. 
78 See Xunzi, ch. 8, “Ru xiao 儒效,” “The teachings of the Ru.” 
79 故君子時詘則詘，時伸則伸也。 Wang 1988, 113. 
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of good and bad government.80 This, however, still does not explain why sages such as Shun 
and great Ru encountered propitious circumstances and Xunzi averse ones. In “Teachings of 
the Ru,” the Xunzi gives an explanation that refers to a discourse that also appears in the 
Qiongda yi shi and echoes the other Mencian idea that a ruling position is pivotal for a sage to 
exert his influence and to change the world.81 In contrast to the Qiongda yi shi, however, the 
Xunzi does not claim that the success depends in any way on Heaven. But we find an identical 
explanation in “The Warning Vessel on the Right” (宥坐) – in its presentation of the story of 
Confucius between Chen and Cai, a story that becomes a central element in the discourse 
about Confucius’ failure in all the early texts that take part in this discourse. 
 
When Confucius once traveled southward toward Chu, he ran into difficulties in the 
territory between Chen and Cai. For seven days he and his disciples had not eaten cooked 
food, only herb soup without a single grain of rice so that the disciples all had a famished 
look. Zilu stepped forward and asked: “I have heard that Heaven responds with good 
fortune to those who do good and with disasters on those who do what is bad. As to our 
situation here and now you, Master, have accrued your virtue, accumulated acts of 
righteousness, and dwelt on the good, and have done so for a long time. Why, then, do 
you live in obscurity?” Confucius replied: “Yóu, you don’t understand, I will tell you. Do 
you think that the wise are certain to be employed? But did not Prince Bigan have his 
heart cut out?!82 Do you think that the loyal are sure to be employed? But did not Guan 
Longfeng endure punishment?! Do you think that those who remonstrate are always 
followed? But was not Wu Zixu slashed apart and exposed outside the eastern gate of 
Gusu?! As a matter of fact, whether one encounters [the right opportunity] or not depends 
on the right time; whether one becomes a worthy or not depends on innate ability. 
Gentlemen who broaden their studies and make profound plans and yet do not meet with 
the right time are numerous. From this can be seen that those who have not met with the 
right time are legion. How should I be the only one? And, indeed, consider the orchid and 
angelica that grow deep in the forest: that there is no one [to smell them] does not mean 
that they are not fragrant. The learning of the gentleman is not undertaken for the sake of 
                                                 
80 “Yao conferred [the empire] on an able man, and Shun encountered the right times. He elevated the worthy 
and promoted the virtuous, so the world was well ordered. But even if a man is a worthy or a sage, if he does not 
encounter the right times, who will recognize him?” 堯授能，舜遇時，尚賢推德天下治。雖有聖賢，適不遇
世，孰知之？Wang 1988, 462. “Alas! Who am I that I alone do not encounter the right times in this disordered 
age!” 嗟！我何人，獨不遇時當亂世！Wang 1988, 467. 
81 “Zaofu was the best charioteer in the world, but without a chariot and a team of horses, he would have had 
nothing to make his abilities manifest. Yi was the best archer in the world, but without bow and arrows, he 
would have had nothing to make his skill known. A great Ru is good at adjusting and uniting the world, but 
without even so little as a hundred square li of territory, he has nothing to show his merits.” 
造父者， 天下之善御者也，無輿馬  則無所見其能。 
羿者，  天下之善射者也，無弓矢  則無所見其巧。 
大儒者， 善調一天下者也，無百里之地，  則無所見其功。Wang 1988, 137. The example 
of the charioteer Zaofu seems to carry a different connotation in the Qiongda yi shi in that it actually identifies 
the great Ru not with Zaofu but with his horse. In both cases, however, actualization of the hidden potential of 
each of the parts of the team is dependent on the other part. 
82 The Xunzi refers to this event again in one of its fu-poems on the disordered world, in which it states that since 
antiquity it has been a constant rule that things turn around after 1000 years (千歲必反，古之常也). Cf. ch. 
26.6, Wang 1988, 482. 
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a success [in his career], but so that if he fails he will not be beset with hardship, that in 
times of grief his sense of purpose will not diminish, and that in regard to knowing 
fortune and misfortune, ends and beginnings, his heart will not suffer illusions. In fact, 
whether one is worthy or not depends on innate ability, whether one acts or not depends 
on the man, whether one encounters [favorable circumstance] or not depends on the right 
time; whether one lives or dies depends on fate. Now, if there is the right person but he 
does not meet with the right time then even though he is worthy, would he be able to put 
his worthiness into practice? Yet if he should chance to meet with the right time, what 
difficulty will there be! Therefore the gentleman studies broadly, develops profound 
plans, cultivates himself and gives his utmost to await his right time.83 
 
I have quoted the passage in full because it contains so many elements that are relevant to our 
analysis and because the numerous verbatim parallels with the Qiongda yi shi are striking.84 
The Xunzi propounds three arguments in this story. First, it continues the earlier explanations 
of the Mengzi that the gentleman studies not for worldly comfort but for inner virtues and that 
he remains firm and steady in times of hardship. Second, in the final passage it even takes the 
experience of hardship as a condition for a gentleman to broaden his horizon and deepen his 
thoughts. It thereby concludes with a re-definition of what real success actually means for a 
gentleman. Third, the Xunzi introduces a new discourse from the following first lines of the 
Qiongda yi shi: “When there is the right man, but there are not the right times, then even if he 
is worthy, he will not be able to put his worhiness into action. However, if there were the right 
times, what difficulties would there be?”85 Accordingly, it is the meeting of the right time that 
decides over worldly success, official position, fame and wealth (although the topic of official 
posts is not explicitly mentioned here). Time, however, is not connected to Heaven in the 
Xunzi. This becomes quite explicit when we look at the sentence “whether one encounters 
[the right opportunity] or not depends on Heaven” (遇不遇者，天也) of the Qiongda yi shi 
that is rendered as “whether one encounters [the right opportunity] or not depends on the right 
time” (遇不遇者，時也) in the Xunzi. Time is one among four factors that decide upon a 
good life: innate ability,86 personal engagement,87 an encounter with the right time,88 and 
                                                 
83 Based on the translation by Knoblock 1994, 249–250; see also Makeham 1998, 79–80; Wang 1988, 526–527. 
84 This has been pointed out by the editors of the Qiongda yi shi and summarized by Paul A. Goldin: “The lesson 
recorded in ‘Qiongda yi shi’ is not situated between Chen and Cai—nor is it even attributed to Confucius—but 
the language and argument contain striking echoes of Xunzi’s account. […] These and other similarities indicate 
that if the account in the Xunzi is not modelled after ‘Qiongda yi shi,’ the two must share a common source or 
sources. Recalling that ‘Qiongda yi shi’ never refers to Confucius’s difficulties between Chen and Cai, perhaps 
we may say that Xunzi was the first writer to combine this teaching about timeliness with the famous legend that 
we know from Analects 15.2—where, as we have seen, the figure of Confucius gives a very different response to 
Zilu.” Goldin 2000, 134–135. 





existential fate.89 Yet, time is more powerful than worthiness, it is the basic condition for any 
successful action. It is this last order of things (time before worthiness) with which the text of 
the Qiongda yi shi starts and which is also reflected in the Xunzi. Taking up this order and the 
whole new topic of timeliness into its discussion of Confucius, the Xunzi seems to insert the 
discourse of timeliness from the Qiongda yi shi.  
If we compare what the Xunzi takes from the Qiongda yi shi with what the Shuoyuan 
takes from it in its “Za yan” 雜言 chapter, it appears that in the Xunzi exactly the remaining 
rest of the Qiongda yi shi text is left out that is transmitted almost in its entirety in the 
Shuoyuan and Hanshi waizhuan 7.6 (the two versions are nearly identical). The same is true 
for the Kongzi jiayu “Zai e” 在厄 version of the story which only shares the orchid passage 
with the Qiongda yi shi. The Kongzi jiayu version in turn includes a passage that is not 
transmitted in any of the other extant forms of this story. It is, however, transmitted as a 
second version of this story (of Confucius between Chen and Cai), the earliest version of 
which can be found in the Zhuangzi (ch. “Rang wang” 讓王), in the Fengsu tongyi (nearly 
identical with Zhuangzi), and also, as second versions of the story, in the Lüshi Chunqiu, 
Shuoyuan and Kongzi jiayu.90 
The conclusion of the Xunzi accords with that of the Zhuangzi, “the gentleman studies 
broadly, develops profound plans, cultivates himself and gives his utmost to await his right 
time.” Turning back to the own person is exactly what the Qiongda yi shi also proposed as a 
solution to a deeper philosophical problem: sober historical and empirical observations had 
clearly revealed that the ideological assumptions of a correspondence between man’s virtue 
and his success so strongly propagated by the Early Zhou were no longer tenable.  
The Xunzi, though upholding the Mengzi’s veneration for Confucius as a sage, 
concedes that Confucius was not able to put his sageliness into practice. He introduces the 
notion of timeliness into the Confucian discourse on success which is neither controlled by 
                                                 
89 死生者，命也。 
90 In this second version of the story Confucius sings and plays the Qin-zither as expression of his cheerful and 
unworried mind. The disciples do not think that this is appropriate and are then disabused by Confucius on the 
fact that this is the appropriate behaviour of a gentleman in such a situation. The Zhuangzi and Kongzi jiayu 
versions of the first story include a short passage of this second story, and the Shuoyuan and Hanshi waizhuan 
versions of the first story also include two sentences which explain that the Master in this situation of distress 
was continuing to read the classics and practice the rituals. Exactly these sentences are missing in the Xunzi 
version, which therefore does not include any traces of this second story and thus does not include the other kind 
of explanation that goes with this second story, namely denying that there is any harm at all: “Confucius said: 
‘What are you talking about? If the gentleman is successful in the Way, that is what is meant by [real] success. 
Failure of the Way is what is meant by [real] failure. (note: the Xunzi uses the opposing terms qiong 窮 and tong 
通 for failure and success, instead of qiong 窮 and da 達 which the Qiongda yi shi uses) As to our case I 
embrace the Way of benevolence and righteousness to face the disasters of our disordered age. How can that be 
considered a failure?’” 孔子曰：「是何言也！君子通於道之謂通，窮於道之謂窮。今丘抱仁義之道以遭
亂世之患，其何窮之為﹗ Zhuangzi “Rang wang” in: Wang 1987: 257. 
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man nor by Heaven. The sage has to turn back to himself and await the right time to be able to 
change the world. 
 
V Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋  
 
The Lüshi chunqiu, the most complex work on timing in the Pre-Qin era, continues the 
discourse of the Xunzi that had combined the Qiongda yi shi and the Mengzi. But the focus of 
the respective Lüshi chunqiu passages lies mainly on the question of how far humans are able 
to control the success of their actions, how much of their success is attributable to their own 
wisdom or efforts, how much to Heaven and how much to other external factors.  
In line with the Qiongda yi shi and the Xunzi, chapter 14.3 of the Lüshi chunqiu argues 
that the accomplishment of a great success depends on both, the right time and the worthiness 
of those who accomplish the action. It is Heaven that gives the opportunity, but it is man who 
seizes it.91 Sages have an insight into when the accomplishment of a certain action will be 
realistic or most effective and therefore await the right time for their respective actions. 
Chapter 14.5.1 continues this train of thought with a stronger focus on the impact of the 
favorable circumstance provided by Heaven.  
14.6 combines both sides in a strictly separated symmetrical presentation of examples 
explaining exactly what the Heavenly (天也) and the human (人也) contributions to success 
are. With numerous intertextual links the chapter connects directly back to our previous 
discussion of the Qiongda yi shi parts in the Xunzi and the two different stories of Confucius 
in the border region of Chen and Cai (using the same story that we find also in the “Rang 
wang” chapter of the Zhuangzi with some minor differences in wording).92 
As the title “Yuhe” 遇合 indicates, 14.7 deals with “encounter” and “concord.” The 
chapter starts with its central theme: “All [successful] ‘encounter’ implies ‘concord.’ When 
times do not ‘concord,’ one must wait for it to ‘concord’ and only become active 
afterwards.”93 Confucius is then presented as an example of someone who met more than 
eighty lords and yet was only able to reach the position of minister of crime in Lu. The 
chapter thus reflects a new problem in the discourse of success. There is no longer a 
                                                 
91 “Heaven will not give him an opportunity twice, time will not remain right for long, someone who is skilled 
does not do his work twice, handling affairs lies in being appropriate in time,” 天不再與，時不久留，能不兩
工，事在當之。 Chen 1990, 769; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 315; Wilhelm 1979; 186–187. 
92 Instead of the contrastive pair qiong—tong 窮—通, for example, the text uses the pair qiong—da 窮—達, like 
the Qiongda yi shi. 
93 凡遇，合也。時不合，必待合而後行。Chen 1990, 815; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 327; Wilhelm 1979, 
197. 
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consensus on what exactly a successful “encounter” is. Obviously, not any opportunity that 
provides a gentleman with the chance to realize his own virtues can count as a successful 
“encounter.”  An encounter needs to “concord” (he 合) with the favorite circumstance of a 
good ruler in order to be successful. The chapter emphasizes that the gentleman has to 
critically examine his own capabilities before he accepts the huge responsibility that comes 
with an office. Since rulers are not wise enough to discern a sage from an ordinary man, since 
it is therefore possible that ordinary men take high positions, and since the consequences of 
bad rule are devastating, a gentleman has to decide by himself whether he is suited to an 
office or not. We have discussed the importance of the topic of whether and when a 
gentleman should seek office in the Mengzi. Yet however, in discussing the same theme, the 
Lüshi chunqiu here shifts attention from the focus on the lack of the ruler’s morality to the 
problem that most rulers even lack the basic intellectual qualification to choose the right 
people. This topic presents the doubts regarding encounters in a new and more focused 
perspective. The morality of a ruler (which can no longer be assumed) can no longer serve as 
a benchmark for the definition of a real encounter, nor is it any longer relevant for the 
discussion about whether, when and why to take an office.94 Even if an encounter appears to 
be pleasing for both sides this does not necessarily mean that it is also truly in concord as 
numerous historical precedents in this chapter demonstrate in which perfectly good and 
honorable people met misfortune due to wrong personal constellations, to misunderstandings 
and to the lack of the right “concord.”95 
14.8 moves this discourse further into a broader philosophical field. Not only people’s 
constellations are unreliable, but, more generally, as the first sentence states, “External things 
cannot be dealt with in any certain way” 外物不可必.96 The outer world itself is utterly 
unreliable and humans have no way of controlling the outcomes of their actions. There is no 
general rule or solution for one’s own personal situation in the external world. There is no 
guarantee that any theory is applicable or any method assuredly works. Everything depends 
on contexts that cannot be known or controlled. Whether an encounter will lead to success or 
not is unpredictable. The crucial problem that is illustrated by a number of stories in this 
                                                 
94 “Among the rulers of the present age those who are capable of understanding people who lead argumentative 
discourses are very few. How can they then get people who are not shallow from those whom they ‘encounter’?” 
世主之能識論議者寡，所遇惡得不苟？Chen 1990, 815; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 328; Wilhelm 1979, 198 
(both translations miss the point). 
95 “This is the reason why it is said: ‘There are no constant principles in “encounter” and “concord.” 
Pleasing/persuading others is merely a matter of behaving compliantly.’” 故曰：遇合也無常。說，適然也。
Chen 1990, 816; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 329; Wilhelm 1979, 198. 
96 Chen 1990, 828, ; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 331; Wilhelm 1979, 200. 
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chapter97 is given expression in the following conclusion: “There is no method for 
persuasions like this and yet they work. How can external things then be dealt with in any 
certain way?”98 The chapter ends with a conclusion that recommends that in view of the 
unreliability of the outer world one should turn to oneself.99 
This expression of extreme mistrust and anxiety in regard to the outer world might 
reflect some aspects of late Warring States period psychology. It also shows the ending point 
of a discourse that had started quite confidently with assumptions about golden times that had 
existed and would eventually return and could therefore be awaited with the firm belief that 
powerful inner virtues would have a transformative effect on the outer world. These last 
discussions, in contrast, reflect the loss of any confidence in the outer world and in the 
efficacy of Confucian morality. They suggest instead an inward turn to the only reliable point 
that can be trusted, the personal self. What started as a strict separation of Heaven and man 
and therefore resulted in the advice to turn back to oneself (fan ji 反己) in the Qiongda yi shi 
has now developed into a strict separation between self and others and leads to a similar 
advice to focus on that which is certain in oneself (bi zai ji 必在己) as the only method to lead 
a good and safe life in this world. 
 
 
                                                 
97 The following story shows very drastically how little any human efforts can prepare one for or protect one 
against external circumstances. “Shan Bao was fond of [life-prolonging] techniques. He detached himself from 
the vulgar, gave up the realm of the dusty world, did not eat grains nor fruit, did not wear comfortable and warm 
clothes, lived in a rock cave in the mountain forests – all in order to live out his full life span. Before he had used 
up his allotted years however, he was eaten by a tiger.” 單豹好術。離俗棄塵，不食穀實，不衣芮溫，身處山
林巖堀，以全其生。不盡其年，而虎食之。 Chen 1990, 829–830; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 334; Wilhelm 
1979, 203. 
Another story shows how little even education can help to solve problems: “Confucius was resting from his 
travels when his horse got away and ate the grain of another man. The uncouth farmer captured the horse. 
Zigong asked that he be allowed to go and persuade the man [to return it]. Zigong used up all his fine phrases, 
but the uncouth farmer would not listen. A provincial who had begun his studies with Confucius said: ‘Please 
allow me to go and persuade him.’ He thereupon went and said to the uncouth farmer: ‘You, sir, don’t plow at 
the Eastern Sea and I don’t plow at the Western Sea. So how could my horse not eat your grain?’ The uncouth 
farmer was very pleased and replied: ‘All persuasions should be as logical as this. How could anyone [talk] like 
that other man?’ He released the horse and handed it over to him.” 孔子行道而息，馬逸，食人之稼，野人取
其馬。子貢請往說之，畢辭，野人不聽。有鄙人始事孔子者曰：請往說之，因謂野人曰：『子不耕於東
海，吾不耕於西海也，吾馬何得不食子之禾？』其野人大說，相謂曰：『說亦皆如此其辯也，獨如嚮之
人？』解馬而與之。 Chen 1990, 830; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 335; Wilhelm 1979, 203–204. 
98 說如此其無方也而猶行，外物豈可必哉？Chen 1990, 830; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 335; Wilhelm 1979, 
204.  
99 “In his personal conduct, the gentleman respects others, but is not necessarily respected by others. He loves 
others, but is not necessarily loved by others. To respect and love others is due to oneself. Being respected and 
loved is due to others. The gentleman ensures what is due to him, he does not ensure what is due to others. If he 
ensures what is due to him then there is nothing which he does not encounter.” 君子之自行也，敬人而不必見
敬，愛人而不必見愛。敬愛人者，己也；見敬愛者，人也。君子必在己者，不必在人者也，必在己無不
遇矣。 Chen 1990, 830; Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 335; Wilhelm 1979, 204. 
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VI Lunyu 論語? 
 
To locate the Lunyu in this discourse, we need to finally analyze how a successful life is 
defined in the Lunyu and how Confucius’ life is portrayed, evaluated and explained. 
Confucius in the Lunyu does not discuss Heaven. Like in the Qiongda yi shi, the 
Heavenly and human realm seem to be regarded as two separate things. Confucius therefore 
merely engages with the human side of virtuous action, de xing 德行, and focus on the self, 
fan ji 反己, to use expressions from the Qiongda yi shi. The questions why Confucius is not 
successful in his political career and how a gentleman should behave when not recognized, 
however, occupy the minds of his students (and also his own)100 throughout the Lunyu and 
obviously require an explanation. I take this as a clear indication that a correlation between 
worthiness and success in a political career was expected in the Lunyu context(s). The Lunyu 
presents this repeatedly as a problem but does not develop a coherent position. In one passage 
in Lunyu 14.5 which perhaps comes nearest to the discourse on the relation between human 
action and successful fate as discussed in the texts above, Confucius appreciates the question 




Nangong Kuo asked Confucius and said: “Yi was good at archery and Ao was rocking 
boats, yet both did not meet their natural deaths. Yu and [Hou] Ji bended down to sow 
grain and yet they came to rule over the world.” Confucius did not respond. After 
Nangong Kuo had left he said: “A gentleman indeed is this man! High virtue indeed 
has this man!” 
 
The Lunyu rather focuses on the relationship between the ideal of a gentleman (junzi 君子), 
an official position (wei 位, shi 試, shi 士, shi 仕, wei zheng 為政) and recognition (zhi 知) or 
fame (ming 名, wen 聞). The question of this relationship is touched upon from different 
perspectives that provide five different approaches to answer this question.  
The first discusses the relation between a successful gentleman and recognition (and 
position).101 This discussion certainly belongs to the oldest strata of the Lunyu because we 
find exactly this theme already in the Dizi wen manuscript of the Shanghai Museum 
Collection dated around 300 BCE which includes the acclamation: “The Master sighed and 
                                                 
100 Lunyu 1.1, 4.14, 8.1, 14.30, 14.35, 15.19. 
101 Even though Confucius appears to be rather indifferent to this problem he nevertheless constantly addresses 
this topic throughout the Lunyu. 
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said: ‘Oh! Nobody recognizes me!’” 子嘆曰: 烏!莫我知也夫!102 The Lunyu starts (1.1) with 




The Master said: “To study and at due times to put it into practice, is this not a 
pleasure? To have friends coming from afar, is this not a joy? Not being indignant 
when people do not recognize oneself, is this not a gentleman?”  
 
Lunyu 4.14 constructs a parellelism between being troubled that nobody recognizes oneself 
and between being troubled that one has no official position.  
 
子曰：「不患無位，患所以立；不患莫己知，求為可知也。」 
The Master said: “Don’t be troubled that you have no official position, be troubled 
about the means by which you establish yourself; don’t be troubled that nobody 
recognizes you, seek what is worth to be recognized.” 
 
A successful gentleman does not strive for the recognition of others but aims at what makes 
others recognize him. 
The second is a discussion on how success and fame are related. A very short passage 
in Lunyu 15.20 states that a gentleman should be keen to build up a reputation:  
 
子曰：「君子疾沒世而名不稱焉。」 
The Mater said: “A gentleman is concerned that when he departs from the world his 
name is not praised.”  
 
This seems to contradict the first discussion on recognition (of which we find another passage 





Lord Jing from Qi possessed one thousand teams of horses, yet on the day he died, the 
people had no virtue to praise him for. Bo Yi and Shu Qi starved at Mount Shouyang, 
yet the people praise them down to the present day. Isn’t this what it is saying? 
 
This passage makes clear that the name and fame of a gentleman does not rest on material 
goods but on moral merits. We find a similar agumentation in Lunyu 12.20 in a discussion on 
the term da 達, one of the central conceptual terms in the Qiongda yi shi 窮達以時. 
 
                                                 
102 Dizi wen 2005: 279, 269 (strips 20, 4). Hunter notes that this precise phrase is also found in other early texts 






Zizhang asked: “How should a shi-scholar be so that he can be called successful?” The 
Master said: “What then would you consider as successful? Zizhang replied: One who 
is certain to be heard no matter whether he is employed at the royal court or at a great 
officials’ house.” The Master said: “This is being heard, not being successful. As a 
matter of fact, someone who is successful presents himself straight and is fond of 
righteousness, he examines what others say and observes their appearance, and he is 
thoughtful of deferring to others. He then is certain to be successfull no matter whether 
he is employed at the royal court or at a great officials’ house. In general contrast, 
someone who is being heard just puts on an air of benevolence while acting contrary 
to it, and he just abides by this without any doubt. He then is certain to be heard no 
matter whether he is employed at the royal court or at a great officials’ house.” 
 
Confucius in this passage is eager to point out the difference between success and fame. In 
Lunyu 15.2 the famous story of Confucius’ distress between Chen and Cai is used to discuss 
the other side of the 窮達 opposition. In this passage Zilu asks the Master the interesting 




When they were in difficulties between Chen and Cai they ran out of grain and the disciples 
became so weak that none of them was able to stand up. Zilu indignantly came to see the 
Master and said: “Does failure actually ever exist for a gentleman?” The Master said: “A 
gentleman is steadfast when he fails, a petty man in such circumstances lets himself go.”   
 
The Master’s response to Zilu’s desperate question is thus negative. Failure and gentleman 
can go together, but if the gentleman is steadfast then he doesn’t fail to be a gentleman, 
failures of the sort encountered between Chen and Cai thus remain outer problems that do not 
affect the gentleman as gentleman. The basic argument in all these passages runs along the 
lines of the distinctions between self-others and inner-outer that we also found in the Mengzi. 
Even the famous story of Confucius’ distress between Chen and Cai is explained within the 
oppositional pattern of harsh external circumstances that, however, should be seen as a 
challenge for the inner virtues by a gentleman. Material wealth, skills, fame and position are 
the main issues that are (and obviously need to be) disparaged by contrasting them with the 
real values that a gentleman strives for: dao 道, de 德, ren 仁, yi 義, gu 固 etc. These 
divisions into material wealth, worldly success, office, power etc vs. Ruist values in the 
Lunyu become even more apparent in the second ten chapters of the Lunyu where Confucius 
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is not intending to secure office103 and is somehow closer to the way Confucius is depicted in 
the Zhuangzi than in his representations in Mengzi and Xunzi, where he appears eager to seek 
office.104 Yet, there is no coherent terminology nor a clear concept. A reputation can be good 
if it is based on moral achievements, and this is what one should strive for, it is bad, however, 
when it is merely based on wealth, power or performance, this should be avoided.  
The third question that relates to the broader discourse on success is whether an 
official position is important and should be gained to exert a moral impact on the world.105 In 
some passages of the Lunyu this discussion is led in reference to Confucius’ not holding an 




Someone asked Kongzi: “Why don’t you take an active role in governance?” The 
Master said: “The Book of Documents says: ‘Filial piety, just filial piety [towards your 
parents] and friendliness towards your brothers, extend this to the realm of 
governance.’ This is also taking an active role in governance, why should this only 
relate to officially playing an active role in governance?”106 
 
Confucius in this passage seems to imply that one can have the same impact on the world 
when following moral standards as when occupying an official position. Lunyu 8.14 (with its 
parallel in 14.26), however, seems to contradict this view: 
 
子曰：「不在其位，不謀其政。」 
The Master said: “If one does not occupy the appropriate official position then one 
should not devise its governance.”107 
 
The passage indicates that there are certain political actions that should only be executed 
when holding the appropriate post in government. Lunyu 5.6 shows that office should not be 
taken for any sake, and Lunyu 15.7 reflects the discussion in the Mengzi (further developed in 
the Lüshi chunqiu) under what circumstances one should engage in government. 
 A fourth and fifth sets of sayings that relate to success are two kinds of reflections on 
Confucius’ success. The fourth depicts him as an employee, not of a worldly ruler but of 
                                                 
103 Makeham 1998, 92–93. 
104 Makeham 1998, 90–91. However, there is constant frustration and lament in the Lunyu which in Zhuangzi is 
replaced by him singing and being joyful so that even his disciples misunderstand him (chap. Rang wang). 
105 Lunyu 2.21, 3.24, 4.14, 4.26, 5.6, 15.7, 17.1, 18.5, 18.7. 
106 Cf. Lunyu 2.21. 
107 The parallel passage in Lunyu 14.26 has one more sentence: 曾子曰：「君子思不出其位。」 Zengzi said: 
‘The gentleman’s thinking does not go beyond his own particular position.’ This sentence in turn has a parallel 
in the xiang 象 commentary of the Zhouyi to hexagram “liang” 艮. 
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When the Master was surrounded in Kuang he said: As King Wen has long passed 
away aren’t the accomplished patterns of order still here with us? If Heaven was about 
to destroy these patterns then those remaining after his death would not have gained 
access to these patterns, if, however, Heaven is not yet destroying these patterns how 
would the people of Kuang then deal with me?”108 
 
Despite all the doubts and sorrows of Confucius displayed in the Lunyu (see part one above) a 
passage like this expresses a self-confidence that lies beyond all these and renders the 
problem of worldly success and recognition somehow obsolete. Yet, a certain tension remains 




The Master said: “Nobody recognizes me!” Zigong said: “What do you do with 
nobody recognizing you Master?” The Master said: “I don’t bear a grudge against 
Heaven and do not blame other people, instead I study the human affairs below and 
thereby reach up to Heaven. The one who knows me, it is Heaven!”109  
 




A border official from Yi asked to meet Confucius and said: “I managed to meet every 
single gentleman who arrived at this place.” Confucius’ followers thereupon arranged 
a meeting with him. When he left he said: “why are you guys distressed upon the 
general decline?110 The world has been without the right Way for a long while, but 
Heaven is about to use Confucius as his alarm bell.”111  
 
This passage is reminiscent of Lunyu 9.5. Both envision Confucius in times of disorder not as 
a government official but as an “official” employed by Heaven and fulfilling a special kind of 
duty. Being in a position above worldly office, Confucius’ teaching is presented as being of 
much greater importance and exerting a much greater impact for the order in the world than 
                                                 
108 Lunyu 9.5. 
109 Lunyu 14.35. 
110 Most commentators and translators interpret sang 喪 as a loss of position. Although this reading would 
support my analysis much better I think it makes more sense to read it in the context of Lunyu 9.5 as a state of 
general decline of the patterns of order (喪斯文). 
111 Lunyu 3.24. 
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any common official position is able to. These passages therefore respond in their own way to 
the same question why Confucius did not hold an office. 
A fifth way to present the theme is through the voice of people outside of Confucius’ 
circle (like the preceding passage from Lunyu 3.24).112 In later chapters the theme has a 
slightly different tinge. It appears as a topic that is so much associated with Confucius that all 
kinds of people address it either urging Confucius to take office (17.1) or warning him to do 





[…] “Can someone be called benevolent who holds his moral treasure hidden and lets 
his state go astray?” Confucius said: “One can’t.” “Can someone be called wise who is 
fond of regulating affairs but constantly misses the right time to do so?” Confucius 
said: “One can’t.” “Days and months are passing by, the years are not with us.” 
Confucius said: “Right, I will get employed!”113 
 
Conclusion 
True success in the Lunyu is always bound to morality. Neither recognition nor fame nor a 
position can match the inner success of moral accomplishment. If Confucius fails in these 
exterior respects it does not matter because he succeeds in those superior respects that define 
a gentleman. As to his (and any true gentleman’s) contribution to the overall moral order, it 
transcends and outreaches the purely worldly impact of governance on the social order by 
securing the continuity of the moral and ritual order of the ancient wise kings that is directly 
linked to the Heavenly order. 
 Like in the depiction of Confucius’ knowledge the Lunyu presents a quite coherent 
image of Confucius in its depiction of his worldly failure yet moral success. It does not, 
however, connect to any of the discourses that we find in the other early texts.  
Confucius is neither depicted as someone who knows exactly when to act in a timely 
manner nor is he waiting for the right times (this seems to start with the last Gongyang 
commentary to Lord Ai 14) like in the Qiongda yi shi. There are no references to timeliness or 
particular good or bad times.114 We do find elements of fatalism in the Lunyu where 
Confucius expresses his belief in the dependence of his own fate on the actions of Heaven. 
This fatalistic notion of timeliness occurs sometimes in the sense that his time has come or 
                                                 
112 Lunyu 3.24, 17.1, 18.5, 18.7. 
113 Lunyu 17.1. 
114 The term ming 命 in Lunyu 14.36 is sometimes interpreted in this way, but could equally well, and in my 
view more convincingly, refer to human orders. 
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has not yet come or, like in 9.22, with a slight doubt whether “There are, are there not, sprouts 
that do not produce blossoms and blossoms that do not produce fruits?”115 The Mozi therefore 
charges Confucianism with being ‘fatalistic.’116 Never do we find, however, any more 
systematic reflection on this, Heavenly time is nowhere in the Lunyu used in a conceptual 
sense as in the Qiongda yi shi. Moreover, the Lunyu does not refer to the same famous 
historical precedents that are central to this particular discourse. Wu Zixu is not mentioned 
once in the Lunyu, Shun is never associated with the question of success or fate. Yet, the 
terms qiong and da are used in a similar way as in the Qiongda yi shi and in the Xunzi as 
expressions of success and failure in a human’s life. 
There are no references to ghosts and spirits’ impact on human fate like in the Guishen 
zhi ming.  
The Mencian ideas that incapable rulers are responsible for Confucius’ failure to take 
office, or that Confucius appeared according to a 500 years cycle of sages appearing in the 
world are all absent in the Lunyu. Two Lunyu concepts of success do have a parallel in the 
Mengzi. First is the fundamental and most coherent idea in the Lunyu that success and failure 
have to be measured by inner moral standards and not by external criteria such as recognition, 
fame, or office. Second is the idea that Confucius cautiously weighed up under what 
conditions to take office. Lunyu 8.13 is particular trenchant in that matter. It does not only 
state that no post should be taken in times of disorder but that by the same token one should 
have a position and be successful in times when the Way prevails.117 If we relate these 
contrastive patterns to the numerous expressions of grievance against the declining world in 
the Lunyu they appear as yet another explanation of why the very fact that Confucius never 
gained an official post is not an indication of his failure but rather a proof of his true 
sageliness. Timeliness is brought into this discussion in the Lunyu only insofar as an office 
should be taken only in times of good government whereas one should hide (or even resist) in 
bad times.118 
 We also do not find any doubt in the belief that humans are able to (at least partly) 
control success, a doubt that is so clearly expressed in the Lüshi chunqiu. The role and quality 
of encounters is nowhwere discussed, instead, and in clear opposition to the Lüshi chunqiu 
                                                 
115 See also Lunyu 14.36. 
116 Cf. Eno 2005. 
117 “The Master said, ‘Be sincere in your trustworthiness and be passionate in your learning, and abide to the 
death in the good way. Do not enter a state that is in peril; don’t stay in a disordered state. Show yourself when 
the Way prevails in the world, but hide yourself when it does not. It is shameful to be poor and humble when the 
Way prevails in the state, it is shameful to be rich and noble when it does not.’”  
子曰:「篤信好學, 守死善道。危邦不人, 亂邦不居, 天下有道則見, 無道則隱。 邦有道, 貧且賤焉, 
恥也, 邦無道, 富且貴焉, 恥也。」 
118 Lunyu 5.2. 
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discourses, the Lunyu expresses full confidence that a gentleman’s actions do have a reliable 
impact on the outer world and that certain methods can be applied to secure social and moral 
order. 
The fourth way to deal with the problem of success, the idea that Confucius fulfills a 
Heavenly task that lies beyond all worldly worries did not appear in any of the other early 
pre-Qin texts. It seems to stand in stark contrast to the passages in which Confucius describes 
himself as someone who simply “learns without tiring and teaches others without wearying” 
學而不厭，誨人不倦,119 that emphasize that Confucius does not see himself as a sage and in 
which his weaknesses are highlighted.  
 
   
VII Conclusion 
 
As in so many other ancient cultures,120 the observation that moral worthiness is not the only 
decisive factor that leads to a successful life stimulated a debate in early China on the 
question which other factors play a role in achieving success (and which factors other than 
moral action could play a role in avoiding harm). We have looked at some early textual 
witnesses of this discourse and have reconstructed some stages of a discourse that starts from 
two different approaches to the problem.  
 Based on a number of historical precedences regarding the success of famous worthies 
the Qiongda yi shi introduced timely encounters with rulers as a second decisive factor 
besides the worthiness of the historical individuals. The two instances of Heaven and man 
were identified as the key factors which in strict separation and entirely independently of each 
other both equally contributed to the success in life. Taking Confucius as the historical 
example by reference to which the relation between moral worthiness and successful life had 
to be defined, the Mengzi identified worthiness with success and therefore had to distinguish 
inner moral success as the true and ultimate success from an inferior outer success of fame, 
wealth and official posts. He neither used Heaven nor timely encounter as models to explain 
Confucius’failure. His not taking office in bad governments was interpreted as an act of 
sageliness. The Xunzi, much more pessimistic about the prospect to change the bad times, 
combined these two approaches and introduced timeliness into the Confucian discourse as the 
decisive factor explaining why Confucius was not successful in implementing his sageliness 
                                                 
119 Lunyu 7.2, 7.34. See for the parallels in Mengzi and Lüshi chunqiu Hunter 2012: 241. 
120 Cf., for example, the Ludlul bēl nēmeqi (also called the Babylonian Job, for a discussion see Müller 1978), or 
The Dispute between a man and his Ba (for a discussion see Assmann 1990). 
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to restore order by means of an official post. The Lüshi Chunqiu develops the discourse 
several steps further by questioning and relativizing basic notions of the discourse such as 
‘timeliness’ and ‘encounter.’ It ends by finally entirely giving up any belief even in the 
notions of good and bad times or anything outside of the inner self that could be relied upon 
to guarantee success. Although the assumptions and arguments vary considerably in the 
discourses analyzed above, the answers seem always to point back to the cultivation of the 
self as the most basic and consistent doctrinal element. The place of the self is constructed by 
contrasts: Heaven is above and humans below, wealth, power, and fame are outside and 
morality is inside. A steady pattern of here and there, inside and outside, Heaven and humans, 
self and other that we find in one way or the other in each of the texts carries the strong 
argument that we should not care too much about these external things and should instead 
care about ourselves for the sake of the Heavenly order of the world. 
Now, where do we place the Lunyu in the historical development of this discourse on 
success and failure?  
 
Dating 
The Lunyu addresses the problem of the correspondence between moral accomplishments and 
successful life that is discussed throughout the texts that we have analyzed. It thus can be 
regarded as a player in the history of this problem. Continuous and changing elements in this 
history could be established for the Qiongda yi shi, the Mengzi, the Xunzi and the Lüshi 
chunqiu. As argued in the conclusion above, the Qiongda yi shi and the Mengzi start two 
different discourses on the same problem that are then combined in the Xunzi and further 
developed in the Lüshi chunqiu.  
 It is difficult to draw straight lines between these stages of the discourse which in our 
narrative of the development of this discourse in the conclusion above seem to follow quite 
neatly upon each other because we do not know how many, and what kind of, discursive 
elements come in between these stages and how exactly they relate to each other.121  
Addressing the same kind of problem, the Lunyu provides a number of reflections on 
the theme of success from different angles. But it only shares two of the elements found in the 
other texts, and these it shares with the Mengzi (and with the Xunzi in so far as the Xunzi 
continues the Mencian discourse). One is the basic division of success and failure into interior 
                                                 
121 The San de 三徳 manuscript from the Shanghai Museum Collection could for example combine some aspects 
of the concept of timeliness as employed in the Qiongda yi shi and some aspects of the power of ghosts and 
spirits as envisioned in the Guishen zhi ming, a text that otherwise can not be connected to any of the analyzed 
discourses. 
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and exterior realms and the other is the precept that one should only take office in times when 
circumstances and means are morally appropriate. However, no change is visible that could 
indicate a historical shift. On this basis alone, the Lunyu could therefore be positioned before, 
between or after the Mengzi and the Xunzi. It does not share other elements with the above 
analyzed texts on the problem of success that could be better dated, such as, for example, the 
role Heaven or man plays in turning human life towards success or failure. Finally, the 
element that is Lunyu specific, the higher calling of Confucius by Heaven, can not be found in 





In our methodological reflections at the beginning of this analysis we postulated that a text in 
order to be dated by means of intellectual history first and foremost needs to contain elements 
of intellectual history. Elements of intellectual history can be detected in the Lunyu. Terms, 
concepts, ideas and problems relate to discourses that can be found in other early texts as 
well. These are not consistent on the level of intell discourses within the Lunyu itself. The 
Lunyu does not present intellectual discourses that belong to a common thread of an argument 
or that relate to other identifiable discourses (outside of texts that contain a considerably high 
number of direct Lunyu quotations like the Dizi wen or the Mengzi). In this respect our model 
of Confucius sayings in the Lunyu as unrelated tesserae seems to describe the textual 
character of the Lunyu quite adequately. It is in line with Hunter’s thesis who argues that 
“Confucius quotation before the advent of the Analects was a dynamic, creative practice in 
which authors treated Confucius sayings as venues for the re-performance of inherited 
wisdom.”122 It also accords to Csikzentmihalyi and Kim’s conclusion.123 
As the main intellectual focus of the book is not on the individual discourses but on a 
larger discourse on Confucius, however, this is where its contribution to intellectual history 
lies and where we can also find coherent views that run through the whole book. Consistent 
elements of intellectual discourse were only found on the level of Confucius portrayals which 
represent a continuous vivid and central discourse in Chinese intellectual history.  
                                                 
122 Hunter 2012: i. Hunter concedes however, that although “Kongzi quotation practice in the early period was a 
decidedly, messy phenomenon” it was more than “a cipher who parroted whatever ideas an author wished to 
attribute to him. […] Kongzi yue sayings were […] not infinitely flexible. Close attention to the functions of 
Kongzi sayings reveals a handful of common threads and interests, which, taken together, illuminate their 
distinctive role within early intellectual discourse” (p. 120). Hunter identifies eight of such common threads (pp. 
120-124). 
123 Csikzentmihalyi and Kim 2014. 
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Second, we claimed that for any dating these elements of intellectual discourses need 
to be identifiable on two levels: first, the continuous and identical part that makes it 
identifiable as an element X, second, the feature of change that makes it datable in a history of 
X. The first level could be identified in two problems that are discussed in many early 
Chinese texts, the problem of Confucius’ knowledge and the problem of his success. 
 
Yet, the construction of Confucius in the Lunyu is so unique among the early pre-Qin texts 
that it is not possible, at least on the basis of the two central themes that have been analyzed 
in this paper, to link it to any datable elements in other texts. We do find similar and 
overlapping representations of Confucius in two other texts, a skeptical Confucius expressing 
uncertainties and doubts in the Gongyang zhuan and a Master who fails in exterior aspects of 
his life such as official position and wealth but who has great accomplishments on the inner 
moral side, a Master who carefully weighs up whether and when to take office. But no 
development of these aspects can be found in other texts that would allow us to reconstruct a 
history of these aspects within which the Lunyu could be located. My attempts to use an 
intellectual history approach to date the Lunyu by analyzing the discursive fields of 
knowledge and success were thus not successful. This does not mean that a dating of the 
Lunyu by means of intellectual history is impossible in principle. It is not possible, I would 
argue, on the level of its internal intellectual discourses on individual terms and concepts such 
as ren 仁, yi 義, xiao 孝 and others. It might be possible on the level of Confucius portrayals, 
but not, I am afraid, on the basis of the two central themes of knowledge and success that I 
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